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The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive: A UK
Perspective
Anzhela Cédelle*
Abstract
The EU Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning
of the Internal Market—the so-called Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD)—was adopted on 12 July
2016. It has become one of the core vehicles for implementing the output of the Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting (BEPS) initiative, a process led by the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), at the EU level. The ATAD has imposed a legally binding obligation upon EU
Member States to incorporate the conclusions of Action 2 (hybrid mismatch arrangements), Action 3
(controlled foreign company (CFC) rules) and Action 4 (interest deductions) of the BEPS in their domestic
laws and regulations, and it has secured a certain uniformity of national implementing measures across
the EU by imposing a common minimum level of protection. In addition, the ATAD has also set out a
general anti-abuse rule (GAAR) and exit tax provisions, which further strengthen the EU’s baseline
protection of tax revenues. The potential impact of this milestone Directive on the Internal Market and
the tax systems of Member States in a short- to long-term period is still to be evaluated. This article offers
preliminary thoughts, focusing primarily on the UK’s perspective. The author first briefly addresses
possible consequences for the EU as a whole, and then analyses the ATAD from the UK’s point of view,
showing how the adoption of this Directive fits into a broader UK tax policy and law both prior to and
following the Brexit vote.
1. Introduction
Direct tax harmonisation in the EU has traditionally been slow in pace and limited in scope. For
decades Member States have guarded their tax sovereignty, displaying a strong reluctance to
agree upon common solutions in this sensitive field. Some proposals spent years on an EU policy
agenda before any progress was made. Yet, this dynamic appears to have changed dramatically
in response to the recent anti-tax avoidance and tax transparency priorities. The EU Tax
Transparency Package (2015),1 the Action Plan for Fair and Effective Corporate Taxation (2015)2
and the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package (2016)3 have set out ambitious goals to facilitate the
convergence of Member States’ tax policies. The progress made so far towards their
implementation stands out as unprecedented.
*Anzhela Cédelle (née Yevgenyeva), Research Fellow, Centre for Business Taxation, Saïd Business School, Oxford
University.
1Commission, Tax Transparency Package of 18 March 2015 (IP/2015/4610).
2Commission, Action Plan for Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation in the EU of 17 June 2015 (IP/15/5188).
3Commission, Anti-Tax Avoidance Package of 28 January 2016 (IP/16/159).
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One of the key outputs of this unique political momentum was a swift adoption of the ATAD
on 12 July 2016.4 The Directive lays down rules against the erosion of tax bases and the shifting
of profits within the Internal Market and out of it. The rules on interest limitation (article 4),
CFCs (articles 7 and 8) and hybrid mismatches (article 9) seek to ensure that Member States
implement the output produced under the G20-OECD initiative against BEPS.5 Two other
accompanying measures—a GAAR (article 6) and an exit taxation (article 5)—have been put
in place in pursuit of the EU’s own tax policy priorities. The ATAD is a bold step forward and
it sets the scene for another far-reaching legislative proposal of the European Commission
(Commission) on the common (consolidated) corporate tax base, which will be relaunched in
the autumn of 2016.6
Given its broad scope, the ATAD raises many questions concerning its potential impact on
the InternalMarket and the tax systems ofMember States. This article offers preliminary thoughts
on these issues, focusing primarily on the UK’s perspective. The author first briefly addresses
possible consequences for the EU as a whole, and then analyses the ATAD from the UK’s point
of view, showing how the adoption of this Directive fits into a broader UK tax policy and law
both prior to and following the Brexit vote.
2. The Internal Market’s perspective
On 8 December 2015, shortly following the publication of the final reports under the OECD
BEPS project and their endorsement by the G20, the Council of the European Union (Council)
called for “common, yet flexible, solutions at the EU level consistent with OECD BEPS
conclusions”.7 The Council emphasised the need for “an effective, swift and coordinated
implementation by Member States” and expressly pointed to an EU directive as the preferred
instrument for the implementation of the G20-OECD BEPS conclusions.8 The Commission’s
response was instant. On 28 January 2016, it published the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package.9 At
the heart of the package were two legislative proposals, which addressed selected issues of BEPS
and proposed to extend the exchange of information between Member States’ tax authorities to
4Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly
affect the functioning of the internal market [2016] OJ L193/1.
5OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2—2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787
/9789264241138-en [Accessed 30 September 2016]; OECD,Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules,
Action 3—2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015),
available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241152-en [Accessed 30 September 2016]; and OECD, Limiting Base
Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4—2015 Final Report, OECD/G20
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787
/9789264241176-en [Accessed 30 September 2016].
6Council of the European Union, BEPS: Presidency roadmap on future work (14 July 2016 (OR. en) 11071/16 FISC
121), para.29.
7 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on corporate taxation—base erosion and profit shifting (8
December 2015) (Council conclusions on corporate taxation), para.10.
8Council conclusions on corporate taxation, above fn.7, paras 10, 12–13.
9 Commission Communication, Anti-Tax Avoidance Package: Next steps towards delivering effective taxation and
greater tax transparency in the EU (28 January 2016, COM/2016/023 final).
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include country-by-country reporting.10 The hard law instruments were supplemented by soft
law measures. The Commission encouraged Member States to promote good governance in tax
matters globally and recommended the EU-compliant approach to tax treaty abuse.11
Although driven by a noble cause, the ATAD was not automatically accepted by Member
States. The differences between the original and final text, as well as a number of documents
prepared by the Presidency of the Council and other political actors involved, shed light on the
main points of disagreement and the political compromises that have been made. Those
disagreements varied from fairly general concerns to detailed technical issues. At the general
level,Member States’ governments expressed reservations concerning potential negative economic
impacts and emphasised the difficulties with fitting the proposed changes into the existing national
tax systems, particularly when it involved the need to introduce completely new rules.12 At the
more technical level, the major areas of disagreement concerned the interest limitation and CFC
rules, as well as a subsequently removed switchover clause. The debate also involved EU national
parliaments. In accordance with the legislative procedure, the ATAD proposal was sent to them
for subsidiarity scrutiny. Four parliaments (the Czech Senate, the German Bundesrat, the
Portuguese Assembleia da República and the Romanian Chamber of Deputies13) engaged in a
political dialogue with the Commission, and two parliaments (the Maltese House of
Representatives and the Swedish Parliament14) objected to the legislative proposal by issuing a
reasoned opinion that it breached the principle of subsidiarity.
Following a few rounds of political and technical negotiations at the EU level, the ATAD’s
initial text was substantially amended to reflect a compromise. The final text, which was less
stringent than the original proposal, won unanimous political support in the Council. The European
Parliament, on the contrary, expressed its dissatisfaction by the later version of the ATAD, as it
had watered-down the minimum standard.15 A broad political agreement was reached on 17 June
2016, subject to a silence procedure that provided Member States an opportunity to raise any
10Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect
the functioning of the internal market (28 January 2016, COM(2016) 26 final, 2016/0011 (CNS)); Commission,
Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of
information in the field of taxation (11 May 2016 (OR. en) 7148/16 FISC 39 ECOFIN 231).
11 Commission Communication, External Strategy for Effective Taxation (28 January 2016, COM(2016) 24 final);
Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/136 of 28 January 2016 on the implementation of measures against tax
treaty abuse [2016] OJ L25/67.
12 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax
avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market—General approach (24May 2016 (OR.
en) 9432/16 FISC 84 ECOFIN 499), para.10.
13IPEX, the InterParliamentary EU information eXchange, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against
tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market (28 January 2016, COM/2016/0026),
available at: www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/document/COM20160026.do#dossier-CNS20160011 [Accessed 30
September 2016].
14 IPEX, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the
functioning of the internal market, above fn.13: Maltese House of Representatives http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB
/scrutiny/CNS20160011/mtkam.do [Accessed 30 September 2016]; Swedish Parliament http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL
-WEB/scrutiny/CNS20160011/serik.do [Accessed 30 September 2016].
15 European Parliament, press release, Parliament calls for crackdown on corporate tax avoidance (8 June 2016),
available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160603IPR30204/parliament-calls-for-crackdown
-on-corporate-tax-avoidance [Accessed 30 September 2016]; European Parliament legislative resolution of 8 June
2016 on the proposal for a Council directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the
functioning of the internal market (COM(2016)0026 – C8-0031/2016 – 2016/0011(CNS)).
492 British Tax Review
[2016] BTR, No.4 © 2016 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
last-minute objections until the midnight of 20 June 2016.16 As the deadline expired without
objections being raised, the draft was agreed. On 12 July 2016, the Council formally adopted
the new rules.17 The ATAD was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 19
July 2016 and entered into force 20 days later.
The implications of the ATAD from the Internal Market’s perspective are best evaluated
through the lens of its declared objectives. First, the ATAD seeks to achieve a better functioning
of the Internal Market by securing the fulfilment of Member States’ “commitment under BEPS”
and ensuring that the actions against tax avoidance practices are implemented “in a sufficiently
coherent and coordinated fashion”.18 Although not all EU Member States are members of the
OECD (which would make them “committed” sensu stricto), their overall support of the
G20-OECDBEPS project has been recognised on multiple occasions at the level of the European
Council and the Council.19 A positive case for EU-wide “coherent and coordinated” actions is
indeed strong. One of the most crucial political factors behind the need for co-ordination is tax
competition. The early adopters of stricter anti-avoidance rules risk undermining their competitive
position and facing the reallocation of business activity. In the Internal Market, which is based
on the idea of free movement, such competition is particularly intense. A co-ordinated approach
to tax avoidance minimises those risks and makes access to one of the largest economies in the
world conditional upon the acceptance of the minimum standards of “fair play”. Hence, the
protection achieved through coordinated measures makes the implementation of BEPS output
less risky for early adopters.
The EU-wide harmonisation measure creates a more robust protection from the Internal
Market’s perspective; yet, it also carries some risks.Whilst non-EU countries are still considering
whether, how and when to put the relevant anti-BEPS measures in place, the EU as a whole is
becoming an early adopter of the G20-OECD’s recommendations. The agreement between
Member States on the design of anti-avoidance measures is cemented by the unanimity voting
requirement: a unanimous agreement of all Member States needs to be secured before any—even
minor—adjustments in the minimum standards can be made. These concerns are partially
addressed in Recital 17 and article 10 of the ATAD, which stipulate that the Commission should
undertake an evaluation of the application of the ATAD four years after it enters into force
(August 2020) and report its findings to the Council. The review provisions draw particular
attention to the impact of article 4 (interest limitation rule) and invite the Commission to offer
the appropriate legislative changes if necessary. This explicit invitation to carry out an ex post
evaluation is important but the challenge of achieving political consensus for any amendments
remains open.
Due to this “lock-in” effect, the fact that the draft ATAD was proposed, amended and then
adopted without a comprehensive impact assessment becomes particularly critical. The
Commission justified this omission by “an urgent current demand for coordinated action in the
16Outcome of the 3475th Council meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, 17 June 2016.
17Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly
affect the functioning of the internal market [2016] OJ L193/1, above fn.4.
18Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly
affect the functioning of the internal market [2016] OJ L193/1, above fn.4, Recital 2.
19 The conclusions of the European Council from 13–14 March 2013 and 19–20 December 2013, and—more
recently—the Council conclusions on corporate taxation, above fn.7.
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EU” and referred to the preparatory work undertaken by the OECD.20 Are these arguments
convincing? With full respect to the extensive consultation process and analytical work carried
out at the global level, the EU-based evaluation takes place in a different context and serves a
different purpose. The OECD’s output neither aimed to provide an impact assessment that
corresponded with the EU’s requirements, nor considered the consequences for early adopters
or specific markets. Furthermore, where the BEPS output offered several options and the ATAD
has pre-selected certain directions for Member States (for example, CFC rules), these policy
choices should have been properly assessed and justified.
Secondly, the ATAD aims to prevent a fragmentation of the Internal Market and to eliminate
“existing mismatches and market distortions”.21 The Directive attempts to balance, on the one
hand, the need for certainty and uniformity in implementing the BEPS outputs across the EU
and, on the other hand, the flexibility that Member States may need to accommodate any special
features of their tax systems.Where G20-OECDBEPS recommendations include a few possible
options, a common EU approach prioritises certain choices with a view to ensuring the proper
functioning of the Single Market. Whilst bringing a greater uniformity in certain respects, the
ATAD sets up a “minimum level of protection” for national corporate tax systems across the
EU (article 3) and, as such, it allows the Member States to introduce stricter rules to safeguard
a higher level of protection for their domestic corporate tax bases. Similarly to other areas of
law where regulatory competition causes an undesirable lowering of standards across the EU,
the ATAD establishes the baseline and then leaves the rest to national authorities.
The “minimum standard” approach makes the ATAD more proportionate but less capable of
eliminating the fragmentation of the Internal Market. In some instances, “existing mismatches”
will remain (due to, for example, the limited scope of article 9 of the ATAD, which deals with
hybrid mismatches). In addition, the nature of substantive provisions is such that it does not
necessarily remove “market distortions” and, in fact, it may have an opposite effect. One can
argue that the Internal Market will not necessarily operate more smoothly with a growing number
of national tax systems imposing restrictions and limitations on business activities in the
cross-border context, such as CFC rules or exit taxation. Apart from increased compliance costs
for businesses, the most immediate risk is that of double taxation. For instance, the interest
limitation rule may cause double taxation as the deductibility of an interest may be restricted,
whilst it remains fully taxable in the hands of the receiving company. The ATAD devotes little
attention to these drawbacks, despite the declaration made in Recital 5 that the Directive “should
not only aim to counter tax avoidance practices but also avoid creating other obstacles to the
market, such as double taxation”. Its explicit guidance on this issue is limited to a declaratory
statement:
“[w]here the application of those rules [rules against the erosion of tax bases and the shifting
of profits in the internal market] gives rise to double taxation, taxpayers should receive
20Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect
the functioning of the internal market (28 January 2016, COM(2016) 26 final, 2016/0011 (CNS)), s.3.
21Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly
affect the functioning of the internal market [2016] OJ L193/1, above fn.4, Recital 2.
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relief through a deduction for the tax paid in another Member State or third country, as the
case may be”.22
Thirdly, one of the principle justifications for the EU’s intervention from the very early stages
of the BEPS process was the need to provide greater legal certainty to taxpayers as regards the
compatibility of the anti-BEPS measures with EU law. Certain anti-avoidance mechanisms
discussed under the BEPS process, such as CFC rules, raised strong concerns in the light of EU
law. The ATAD seeks to reassure the Member States’ lawmakers and taxpayers by paving the
way for “EU-compliant” implementation. Yet, it offers only a partial solution. Even though the
Directive draws a common line for the implementing measures, Member States may go beyond
the minimum standard, which re-opens the question of compatibility. Furthermore, the ATAD’s
provisions themselves may raise certain concerns. For instance, the scope of the EU GAAR and
its interaction with the existing domestic anti-abuse mechanisms generates many questions and,
in some instances, will undermine rather than increase legal certainty. The lengthy process of
EU litigation means that a few years may pass before any clarity on the application of this and
other provisions can be achieved.
Finally, the key question regarding the ATAD, which is not explicitly addressed in its
preparatory documents, is the following: will the ATAD relieve the tension caused by tax
competition between Member States? On the one hand, the ATAD secures a commitment from
each EU country to implement selected G20-OECDBEPS recommendations. It is legally binding
for Member States and is backed up by strong enforcement mechanisms at the EU level. The
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) authorises the Commission to start
an infringement procedure as soon as the period provided for implementation measures has
passed, requesting a lump sum or penalty payment if aMember State fails to provide notification
of measures transposing a directive.23 Hence, the ATAD offers a strong reassurance to the early
adopters that similar steps will be taken by other EU jurisdictions within the set deadline.
Consequently, those countries that were supporting the G20-OECD BEPS process will certainly
find it easier to move forward with the implementation of its output. On the other hand, as the
possibilities for profit shifting are becomingmore constrained, the competition over real economic
activity can be expected to increase. One could predict that the competition forces will keep
driving the tax policies of EUMember States. This may generate a more rapid race to the bottom
of corporate tax rates and an increase in other forms of competition permissible under the current
international and EU rules. Are these effects the lesser evil?24 If judged from the perspective of
ensuring a level playing field and an equitable treatment of all corporate taxpayers, the answer
is in the affirmative. Nevertheless, viewed from the perspective of tax revenue loss in a medium
to long-term period, the implementation of the ATAD may increase the pressures on Member
States’ budgets and create new distinct challenges that will need to be dealt with.
To sum up, although the case for a co-ordinated response within the Internal Market is strong,
the ATAD has raised several concerns. The EU’s desire to “keep momentum” has resulted in a
22Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly
affect the functioning of the internal market [2016] OJ L193/1, above fn.4, Recital 5.
23TFEU [2012] OJ C326/1, 26/10/2012 art.260(3).
24For a similar question raised in the context of the OECD and EU campaign against preferential tax regimes (1998),
see M. Keen, “Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful” (2001) 54 National Tax Journal 757.
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fast-moving pace of change without a proper evaluation of possible consequences, in particular
from the Internal Market’s perspective. The period that has been provided to Member States for
the transposition of the ATAD, leaves enough time for the Commission to make additional
inquiries concerning the possible impact of the ATAD (and the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package
more generally) on national tax systems and business activity in the Internal Market, and to
propose any measures that may be necessary to address potential drawbacks. Associated risks
should be carefully evaluated. Several possible directions for such inquiries can be suggested,
that is the issues of double taxation, the increased compliance burden for businesses, the adverse
impact on the tax competitiveness of the Internal Market at the global level and transformations
in tax competition between Member States. In this context, a set of concrete measures that
enhance the competitiveness of the Internal Market in the global arena and that may stimulate
business activity and economic growth should receive far greater attention in order to
counterbalance the EU’s ambitious anti-tax avoidance agenda.
3. The UK’s perspective
The general deadline for the implementation of the ATAD and certain derogations from it were
subject to negotiations at the stage of adoption; as a result, EU Member States have been given
more than two years to complete the process of transposition and notify the Commission. Article
11 of the ATAD sets out a general rule that Member States shall transpose the ATAD into their
national laws, regulations and administrative provisions by 31 December 2018. Those provisions
shall take effect from 1 January 2019. There are two derogations from this general rule. The
transposition of article 5 (exit taxation) shall be completed by 31 December 2019 with the
provisions entering into force by 1 January 2020. Another derogation is envisaged for the interest
limitation rule. Member States with targeted rules which are “equally effective to the interest
limitation rule” found in the Directive, may continue to apply these targeted rules until the OECD
reaches agreement on a minimum standard with regard to BEPS Action 4, or until 1 January
2024 at the latest.
The political implications of the ATAD, as well as the amount of technical legal work to be
undertaken at the domestic level, will vary considerably from one Member State to another.
From a political perspective, the strongest impact will be felt in Member States with a relatively
weak appetite for anti-BEPS measures. From a legal perspective, each national tax system will
be evaluated in the light of the minimum standard imposed by the ATAD. If the national tax
rules fall short of providing the necessary level of protection against the erosion of tax bases and
the shifting of profits, changes will need to be made accordingly. The ATAD’s impact will be
most significant in those countries that need to put in place totally new anti-avoidance
mechanisms, such as GAAR, CFC or exit tax rules, or to introduce material changes in the
existing laws.
The UK does not score highly under either of these two criteria. As a long-term supporter
and one of the “thought leaders” of the BEPS process, the UK Government made it clear early
on that the G20-OECD’s recommendations would be promptly implemented. In comparison
with some Member States that have less elaborate anti-avoidance legislation, the scope of legal
change will also be less extensive. Furthermore, the Brexit vote, which took place a few days
after a political agreement was reached upon this Directive, makes certain drawbacks of the
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ATAD less significant and even its binding force over the UK questionable, at least in the medium
to long-term period. As noMember State exercised its right to veto this legislative proposal, one
may assume that the EU-level co-ordination offered a “win-win” outcome for all the participants.
This article puts forward that the “win” was certainly achieved by the UK. The rest of this section
further elaborates on these observations.
3.1. The UK corporate tax policy context
In recent years, UK tax policy has been dominated by two objectives: 1. enhancing the
competitiveness of the tax system; and 2. strengthening its resilience to tax avoidance. In the
Coalition Agreement, published in May 2010, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats
ambitiously declared their goal to be the creation of the most competitive corporate tax regime
in the G20.25 The 2010 Corporate tax road map, which detailed the Coalition Government’s
plans for reform, clearly adhered to the need to make the UK corporate tax more competitive.26
The aim was for the corporate tax system to become “an asset for the UK”, making the business
environment more attractive and stimulating multinationals to invest.27
Alongside the competitiveness agenda, in a somewhat uncomfortable bundle, the Coalition
Government also prioritised the need for “a more strategic approach” to tackling tax avoidance.28
The new strategy was launched in June 201029 and was further detailed in the report on Tackling
tax avoidance which was published in March 2011.30 The 2015 report on Tackling tax evasion
and avoidance summarised the achievements and outlined next steps to continue a crackdown
on tax evasion and avoidance.31 The political message was clear: “[w]e are hitting tax avoidance
and tax evasion harder than ever before”.32
The anti-avoidance agenda was quickly elevated to the global arena. The UK Government
repeatedly declared its strong interest in establishing co-operation with other countries, pointing
out that
“while we are determined to take every possible action against abuse of the UK tax rules,
the truth is that in a global economywhere goods and services flow freely between countries,
measures taken in Britain alone will not deal with the problem; we need global tax rules
too. That is why we have been pushing, through the G8 and the G20, the European Union
and the OECD, for global solutions.”33
In view of these objectives, the UKGovernment has become one of the driving forces behind
international tax reform by helping to initiate the process, actively engaging with G20 and OECD
partners, and providing funding for the work undertaken by the OECD on BEPS issues. The
25HM Government, The Coalition: our programme for government (May 2010), 10.
26HM Treasury, Corporate tax road map (29 November 2010).
27HM Treasury, Corporate tax road map, above fn.26, para.1.2.
28HM Treasury and HMRC, Tax policy making: a new approach (June 2010), paras 2.14–2.15.
29HM Treasury and HMRC, Tax policy making: a new approach, above fn.28.
30HM Treasury, Policy paper: Tackling tax avoidance (28 March 2011).
31HM Treasury and HMRC, Tackling tax evasion and avoidance (March 2015).
32HM Treasury and HMRC, Tackling tax evasion and avoidance, above fn.31, 4.
33HMTreasury and HMRC, Tackling aggressive tax planning in the global economy: UK priorities for the G20-OECD
project for countering Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (19 March 2014).
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Coalition Government’s position on the G20-OECD project was initially explained in a special
report on Tackling aggressive tax planning in the global economy (March 2014).34 The subsequent
Conservative Government stood by these priorities. Following the endorsement of the final 2015
BEPS reports by the G20, the UK Government confirmed its intention to become one of the
early adopters. The explanation of how the G20-OECDBEPS output has been and will be further
integrated into the UK tax system can be found in the Business tax road map (March 2016).35
To facilitate the implementation process at the global level, the UK Government also engaged
closely in the development of a multilateral intergovernmental instrument that will allow the
modification of existing bilateral tax treaties in accordance with the BEPS recommendations.
The UK chairs the ad hoc group of nearly 100 countries, which is working on the newMultilateral
Instrument to Implement Tax Treaty-Related Measures to Combat BEPS.36
In this context, it comes as no surprise that when the Commission published the Anti-Tax
Avoidance Package on 28 January 2016, the reaction of the UK Government was positive (even
though it was not without reservations). The UK shared the underlying objective to put in place
co-ordinated EU-wide measures against tax avoidance and, in particular, the Commission’s
intention to ensure the implementation of the BEPS recommendations.37 In the fourth Explanatory
Memorandum of 12 February 2016, which provided explanations of the draft ATAD to the UK
House of Commons, the Government confirmed that “it would be beneficial to ensure that all
Member States, including those that are not members of the OECD, implement the final OECD
BEPS outputs”.38 In line with the Commission’s justification for the ATAD, the UK Government
put forward that the EU Directive would contribute to a greater consistency in international tax
rules and to the elimination of disparities in national tax rules that could be exploited by
multinational companies. It also repeated that a coherent approach to tax avoidance at the EU
level would carry the benefit of legal certainty for taxpayers and would preserve the
competitiveness of the EU’s tax environment. This position was fully consistent with the UK’s
proactive role in international efforts against tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning by
multinationals. In addition, the early implementation of the BEPS recommendations by the UK
Government raisedwidespread concerns that thesemeasures could undermine the competitiveness
of the country’s corporate tax regime, which had been built up so successfully in recent years.
In this context, the EU-wide commitment was a very timely and welcome development for the
UK Government in order to address these concerns.
At the same time, in line with its traditional Euro-sceptic perspective, the UK Government
emphasised that the EU measures must remain “effective, proportionate and consistent with the
34HMTreasury and HMRC, Tackling aggressive tax planning in the global economy: UK priorities for the G20-OECD
project for countering Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, above fn.33.
35HM Treasury, Business tax road map (March 2016).
36OECD,Multilateral instrument for BEPS tax treaty measures: the Ad hoc Group, available at: http://www.oecd.org
/tax/treaties/multilateral-instrument-for-beps-tax-treaty-measures-the-ad-hoc-group.htm [Accessed 30 September
2016].
37UK House of Commons, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16: Documents considered by the European Scrutiny
Committee on 9 March 2016 (2016), HC 342-xxiv, Ch.7, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.7.7.
38UK House of Commons, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16: Documents considered by the European Scrutiny
Committee on 9 March 2016, above fn.37, Ch.7, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.7.56.
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OECD recommendations”.39 Departures from the OECD’s output were opposed by the UK
Government on the basis that they could generate mismatches. The UKGovernment also argued
that the flexibility of options offered in the G20-OECDBEPS reports should be retained to allow
for the tailoring of the anti-avoidance measures to domestic circumstances.40 The fourth
ExplanatoryMemorandum of 12 February 2016 illustrates several specific concerns that the UK
Government had at the early stages of negotiations. First, it was concerned that the initial
provisions of the ATAD went “beyond or are not entirely consistent with the OECD
recommendations, and may not be proportionate”.41 The main areas where the alignment with
BEPS outputs was sought included the initial proposals in relation to hybrid mismatches, CFC
rules and interest limitation rules.42 Secondly, the UKGovernment opposed the switchover clause
as a disproportionate measure: “whereas a low effective tax rate test can be a useful indicator of
where there is a higher risk of avoidance taking place, low tax rates are not by themselves
harmful”, and relying upon such a test “as the sole criterion” is therefore disproportionate.
Thirdly, and more generally, the UK Government expressed concerns about the lack of “a full
impact assessment” for the draft ADAT, which did not allow it to assess the costs and benefits
of the proposal. Yet, it appeared that the main purpose of this argument was to bring the EU’s
response closer to the G20-OECD BEPS recommendations.43
3.2. The legal consequences in a nutshell: what lies ahead?
In his letter of 9 May 2016, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury (David Gauke) further
explained that the EU actions against tax avoidance were welcomed by the UK in so far as they
implemented the internationally agreed recommendations under the BEPS project and did not
go beyond or depart from those recommendations; and he also said that the UK was
“willing also to consider EU legislation on tax where this is consistent with existing UK
legislation or policy, and would strengthen the tax rules and tax administration in other
Member States”.44
All five components of the ATAD are broadly consistent with these declarations. The only
provision that could have brought about a visible departure from the UK’s existing corporate
tax policies, namely the switchover clause, was removed from the final text of the Directive.
39UK House of Commons, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16: Documents considered by the European Scrutiny
Committee on 9 March 2016, above fn.37, Ch.7, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.7.4.
40UK House of Commons, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16: Documents considered by the European Scrutiny
Committee on 9 March 2016, above fn.37, Ch.7, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.7.57.
41UK House of Commons, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16: Documents considered by the European Scrutiny
Committee on 9 March 2016, above fn.37, Ch.7, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.7.56.
42 UK House of Commons, Documents considered by the European Scrutiny Committee on 11 May 2016 (2016),
Ch.10, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.10.20.
43UK House of Commons, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16: Documents considered by the European Scrutiny
Committee on 9 March 2016, above fn.37, Ch.7, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.7.58.
44UKHouse of Commons,Documents considered by the European Scrutiny Committee on 11 May 2016, above fn.42,
Ch.10, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.10.20.
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a) Interest limitation rule
Article 4 of the ATAD introduces a rule restricting the deductibility of interest, seeking to limit
the opportunities for profit shifting through the use of interest expense. In the process of
negotiations, the UK supported the introduction of interest limitation rules by all Member States.
However, consistently with its above-mentioned priorities, the UK insisted that such rules must
correspondwith the G20-OECDBEPS outputs, take into account the ongoing work at the OECD
level and leave sufficient flexibility for Member States, which would allow for the design of
“effective, proportionate and targeted” rules tailored to the needs of national tax systems.45 The
final version of article 4 of the ATAD represents a compromise between those Member States
that requested greater flexibility and those that opposed additional waivers due to the risk of
undermining the effectiveness of the limitation rule.46 It is broadly consistent with the G20-OECD
recommendations on Action 4 BEPS, and it has also left more room for flexibility in application.
As a general rule, no deduction will be given for any borrowing costs exceeding 30 per cent
of the taxpayer’s earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA).47 This
general rule may be qualified in several ways. Member States may exclude stand-alone entities
from the application of this rule, as well as give the right to taxpayers to deduct exceeding
borrowing costs up to three million euros.48 Loans that were concluded before 17 June 2016 (and
not subsequently modified) and loans used to fund certain qualifying long-term public
infrastructure projects may be disregarded.49 Where the taxpayer is a member of a consolidated
group for financial accounting purposes, the ATAD allows Member States to choose one of the
two exclusion rules, based on either an equity/total assets-ratio or a group EBITDA-test.50 Finally,
the “financial undertakings”, as defined in article 2(5) of the ATAD, may be excluded from the
scope of the rule.51 The ATAD envisages several options for the carrying forward (and back) of
exceeding borrowing costs,52 and it also provides a transitional period during which Member
States may rely upon the existing “equally effective” interest limitation rules (as explained earlier
in this section).53
Overall, article 4 of the ATAD has not brought a revolutionary change in the UK context,
since the Government had already committed to the introduction of the new restrictive rules on
the deductibility of interest before it was adopted. The first round of consultations was launched
by the UK Government on 22 October 2015.54 In March 2016, the Budget and the Business tax
road map confirmed that the Government would proceed with these plans and the new rules on
45UKHouse of Commons,Documents considered by the European Scrutiny Committee on 11 May 2016, above fn.42,
Ch.10, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.10.25.
46 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax
avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market—General approach (24May 2016 (OR.
en) 9432/16 FISC 84 ECOFIN 499), para.12.
47ATAD art.4(1).
48ATAD art.4(3).
49ATAD art.4(4).
50ATAD art.4(5).
51ATAD art.4(7).
52ATAD art.4(6).
53ATAD art.11(6).
54HM Treasury and HMRC, Tax deductibility of corporate interest expense: consultation (22 October 2015).
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interest deductibility should take effect from 1 April 2017.55 The second consultation document
was released on 12May 2016.56 The eventual substantive provisions will have to satisfy the EU’s
minimum standard, but article 4 of the ATAD appears sufficiently flexible. In relation to the
date of entry into force, as things currently stand, the UK remains committed to a shorter
implementation period than that provided under the ATAD.
b) Exit taxation
The exit tax rules are set out in article 5 of the ATAD. It provides a common framework for
taxing capital gains generated in the territory of the Member State of origin at the time of the
exit. The exit charge will be levied on certain cross-border transfers of assets, tax residence or
business carried out by the permanent establishment (PE) within the EU or in the third-country
context. More specifically, article 5(1) of the ATAD defines that the tax will apply to a taxpayer
that: 1. transfers assets from its head office (HO) to a foreign PE; 2. transfers assets from a PE
in a Member State to a foreign HO or PE; 3. transfers its tax residence to another country; or 4.
transfers business carried on by its PE in a Member State to another country—all in so far as the
Member State of exit loses the right to tax due to the transfer. The taxable gain is calculated as
“the market value of the transferred assets, at the time of exit of the assets, less their value for
tax purposes”.57
The ATAD broadly reflects the existing case law of the Court of Justice of the European
Union in this field.58 Accordingly, it secures the right of a taxpayer to defer the payment of an
exit tax for transfers within the EU or the European Economic Area (EEA). The deferred payment
may be subject to interest charges. In certain circumstances, where there is “a demonstrable and
actual risk of non-recovery”, such deferral may also be conditioned by the provision of a
guarantee.59 Article 5(4) of the ATAD defined several circumstances in which the deferral will
be “immediately discontinued”, including the transfer of the transferred assets, the taxpayer’s
tax residence or the business carried out by its PE to a third country. The “receiving” Member
States must accept the value of the assets established by the “exit” state for tax purposes unless
this value does not reflect “market value” (that is “the amount for which an asset can be exchanged
or mutual obligations can be settled between willing unrelated buyers and sellers in a direct
transaction”).60
Since the UK already imposes an exit charge on the unrealised gains of a company that ceases
to be a UK resident, the ATAD will trigger only small-scale adjustments. These changes will
make the existing rules more restrictive. For instance, UK resident companies that intend to
transfer their corporate residence to another EU or EEAMember State could be left with a shorter
55HM Treasury, Business tax road map, above fn.35.
56HM Treasury and HMRC, Tax deductibility of corporate interest expense: consultation on detailed policy design
and implementation (12 May 2016).
57ATAD art.5(1).
58National Grid Indus BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond/kantoor Rotterdam (C-371/10) EU:C:2011:785
(ECJ); European Commission v Portuguese Republic (C-38/10) EU:C:2012:521 (ECJ);DMCBeteiligungsgesellschaft
mbH v Finanzamt Hamburg-Mitte (C-164/12) EU:C:2014:20 (ECJ); Verder LabTec GmbH & Co KG v Finanzamt
Hilden (C-657/13) EU:C:2015:331 (ECJ).
59ATAD art.5(3).
60ATAD art.5(5)–(6).
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period of deferral (five instead of 10 years). Furthermore, the UK rules will need to be amended
to broaden their application in relation to a transfer of assets involving PEs. However, the binding
impact of this provision upon the UKwill depend on the future status of the UK-EU relationship.
As mentioned earlier, in the process of negotiations, the date of transposition for article 5 of the
ATAD was postponed until 31 December 2019 pursuant to the demand of those Member States
that currently do not have such rules in place.61
c) GAAR
The UK Government was open to the consideration of a minimum standard EU-wide GAAR if
this would not create unnecessary uncertainty for taxpayers, or “undermine situations where
Member States already have effective legislation in place at national level”.62 The UK introduced
a GAAR, which relies upon the double-reasonableness test, in 2013.63 The EU rule was regarded
as “very similar to existing rules within the UK tax code, both through the legislation for the
UKGAAR and well-established case law”.64 This proposition was not universally accepted. One
obvious uncertainty arises from the CJEU’s power to interpret the EU GAAR: the CJEU’s
guidance may affect the application of the provision. At this stage, however, it is not clear what
legal and/or practical effects the CJEU case law will retain following Brexit, so the question as
to the relevance of these concerns in the UK context remains open.
d) CFC rules
The CFC rules allow the tackling of base erosion and profit shifting by reattributing the income
of a low-tax controlled foreign company and making it taxable in the “home jurisdiction”. The
scope of CFC rules caused some of the most considerable disagreements betweenMember States
at the negotiations stage, so a number of changes were made to the Commission’s original
proposal. The ATAD has introduced a general rule that the taxpayer’s Member State must include
in the tax base: 1. certain predefined categories of non-distributed (passive) income of a controlled
foreign company unless the company is undertaking “a substantive economic activity supported
by staff, equipment, assets and premises, as evidenced by relevant facts and circumstances”65;
or 2. the non-distributed income of CFCs arising from “non-genuine arrangements which have
been put in place for the essential purpose of obtaining a tax advantage”.66 The substantive
economic activity test, which is part of the first rule, may be disapplied in the third-country
context. A “controlled foreign company” is defined as an entity, or a PE of which the profits are
not subject to tax (or are exempt) in the “home” Member State, which satisfies specified control
61 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax
avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market—General approach (24May 2016 (OR.
en) 9432/16 FISC 84 ECOFIN 499), para.13.
62UK House of Commons, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16: Documents considered by the European Scrutiny
Committee on 9 March 2016, above fn.37, Ch.7, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.7.57.
63FA 2013 s.207.
64UKHouse of Commons,Documents considered by the European Scrutiny Committee on 11 May 2016, above fn.42,
Ch.10, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.10.29.
65ATAD art.7(2)(a).
66ATAD art.7(2)(b).
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thresholds and the low effective tax rate test.67 Certain qualifications that allow Member States
to limit the scope of CFC rules can be found in article 4(3)–(4) of the ATAD.
Since 1984 the UK has had a special regime for CFCs. These rules have changed several
times, most recently in 2013 as part of a broader move towards a more territorial approach to
taxation. When the ATAD was proposed, the UK Government supported the introduction of
CFC rules in all Member States.68 It regarded the lack of CFC rules in other countries as potentially
creating “a competitive disadvantage”, so the EU-wide standard was clearly for the benefit of
the UK.69 In line with its general priorities, the UK Government insisted on flexibility in relation
to CFC rules, which would allow Member States “to design their own rules, provided they are
consistent with the OECD framework”.70 The final version of the ATAD broadly follows the
OECD framework, and no substantive amendment of the UK CFC rules is deemed necessary.
e) Hybrid mismatches
On 5 October 2014 the UKGovernment announced its intention to introduce domestic provisions
to give effect to the recommendations of BEPS Action 2 (hybrid mismatch arrangements).71 The
consultations on the implementation in the UK were opened on 3 December 2014.72 This was
followed by the draft legislation, which was again offered for consultation.73 The rules, which
were incorporated in the 2016 Finance Bill, will take effect from 1 January 2017.74 Against this
background, the UK Government was understandably supportive of introducing effective
international rules to prevent hybrid mismatches. As in other instances referred to above, the
UK Government prioritised consistency with the approach agreed at the OECD level, arguing
for the rules that would not be less effective than the BEPS output.75
Article 9 of the ATAD is, however, much more modest in scope. The new rules are brief and
apply only to intra-EU situations. It has been agreed at a political level that further proposals on
hybrid mismatches involving third countries will be made by the Commission in October 2016
with a view to reaching an agreement by the end of 2016.76 This political solution aimed at
resolving disagreements between thoseMember States in favour of extending the scope of article
9 to third countries and to other forms of hybrid mismatches in order to realign it with Action 2
BEPS, and otherMember States that were not prepared to adopt such extensions without additional
technical examination.
67ATAD art.7(1).
68UK House of Commons, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16: Documents considered by the European Scrutiny
Committee on 9 March 2016, above fn.37, Ch.7, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.7.57.
69UKHouse of Commons,Documents considered by the European Scrutiny Committee on 11 May 2016, above fn.42,
Ch.10, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.10.23.
70UKHouse of Commons,Documents considered by the European Scrutiny Committee on 11 May 2016, above fn.42,
Ch.10, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.10.23.
71HM Treasury, Government takes further step to clamp down on aggressive tax planning (5 October 2014).
72HM Treasury and HMRC, Tackling aggressive tax planning: implementing the agreed G20-OECD approach for
addressing hybrid mismatch arrangements (3 December 2014).
73HMRC, Corporation Tax: anti-hybrid rules (9 December 2015, withdrawn on 17 March 2016).
74HMRC, Corporation Tax: anti-hybrids rules (16 March 2016).
75UKHouse of Commons,Documents considered by the European Scrutiny Committee on 11 May 2016, above fn.42,
Ch.10, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.10.21.
76 Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation), Report to the Council (13 June 2016 (OR. en) 9912/16 FISC 97
ECOFIN 558).
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f) Switchover clause
The switchover clause would have carried the most significant implications for the UK’s current
corporate tax system. It would have influenced certain exemptions from corporation tax that
apply to the receipt of dividends, as well as the elective exemption regime from UK corporate
tax for profits generated by foreign PEs. Broadly, the introduction of the switchover clause would
have led to a less territorial system of taxation. The UK Government was not prepared to accept
the switchover rule unless it was offered as an optional tool.77At the negotiations stage, it reiterated
the UK’s commitment to a territorial approach to taxing corporate profits, which can be limited
only in certain instances to prevent tax avoidance, for example, when CFC rules become
applicable.78 The introduction of the switchover clause was refused on the grounds of it being
unnecessary when “effective” CFC rules are combined with a “properly applied” transfer pricing
regime.79 The UK Government also emphasised that “a low tax rate is not harmful in principle,
and it is a point of principle in relation to tax sovereignty that countries have the right to set their
own tax rates”.80 This can probably be seen, at least partially, as an attempt to defend the UK
Government’s own right to a low corporate tax rate. The switchover clause raised irreconcilable
objections, so it was removed from the final text of the ATAD.
3.3. Following the Brexit vote
The Brexit referendum took place on 23 June 2016, just a couple of days after a political
agreement was reached upon the ATAD. Does the Brexit vote change the implications of the
ATAD for the UK? Will the ATAD even come into effect, given that most provisions will have
to be transposed by the end of 2018? In a nutshell, the withdrawal from the EU must follow the
procedure stipulated by article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). To start with, the
UK needs to notify the European Council of its intention to seek a withdrawal. There is no set
time frame as to when this has to be done; neither is there a predetermined procedure that needs
to be used. The newUK PrimeMinister (TheresaMay) is determined to trigger article 50—which
will initiate the formal Brexit negotiations—without seeking Parliamentary approval, which in
itself raises many controversies.81 Once triggered, article 50 TEU provides two years for
negotiations, unless the European Council unanimously decides to extend this period. The EU
Treaties cease to apply to the Member State seeking the exit from the date that the withdrawal
agreement enters into force or, failing that, two years after the notification is given. TheresaMay
has recently announced that the notification will not be made until the start of 2017 at the earliest.82
In view of this political statement, the ATAD may become enforceable whilst the UK is still a
full member of the EU.
77UK House of Commons, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16: Documents considered by the European Scrutiny
Committee on 9 March 2016, above fn.37, Ch.7, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.7.57.
78UK House of Commons, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16: Documents considered by the European Scrutiny
Committee on 9 March 2016, above fn.37, Ch.7, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.7.57.
79UK House of Commons, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16: Documents considered by the European Scrutiny
Committee on 9 March 2016, above fn.37, Ch.7, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.7.57.
80UK House of Commons, Twenty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16: Documents considered by the European Scrutiny
Committee on 9 March 2016, above fn.37, Ch.7, “HMT Taxation: avoidance”, para.7.57.
81BBC News, Government to “push ahead” with Brexit (31 August 2016).
82BBC News, above fn.81.
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The UK will be seeking a “unique” deal with the EU that will determine the scope of mutual
rights and obligations.83 As negotiations progress, the Government and Parliament would have
to search for a suitable approach to the legal status of EU-based laws, rules and regulations:
those provisions may be kept as part of the legal system, or may be amended or repealed. It is
possible, and even likely, that UK laws implementing EU law, including the ATAD, will initially
remain effective. The legal constraints on UK laws will be agreed upon in the process of the
Brexit negotiations and will depend on any subsequent developments in the UK–EU relationship.
The exact scope of sovereignty that will be regained as a consequence of Brexit will be defined
on the basis of mutual political compromise. Yet, unless agreed to the contrary, UK laws will
be free to follow a different path to their EU counterparts. It is possible, therefore, that the UK
will be free to depart from the ATAD if it is deemed necessary. In other words, whilst EUMember
States will be “locked-in” to the ATAD’s agreement by the unanimity vote, the UK’s control
over its legislation is subject to the Brexit negotiations. This “freedom” may prove useful if the
minimum standard imposed by the ATAD becomes uncomfortably tight for some reason.
However, despite some speculations that the tax competitiveness agenda may force the UK to
defer the implementation of the BEPS-related measures, or to adopt a more lenient approach,
politically it seems highly unlikely. Tax competition is likely to manifest itself in a different
form: through a gradual lowering of the UK’s main corporate tax rate below 17 per cent, as well
as a potential further reduction of the current 10 per cent tax rate under the Patent Box.84
The drawbacks of Brexit are equally conditional upon the ultimate outcome of negotiations;
however, a few preliminary conclusions can already be made. Prior to the Brexit vote, the fact
that the ATAD is to secure the commitment of EU-based competitors to the implementation of
the BEPS recommendations in certain select areas could have been regarded as a major gain for
the UK Government. Following Brexit, the UK will have no access to a powerful tool for
influencing EU-wide policies. Its international efforts will naturally concentrate on an alternative
global player in this area, namely the OECD. It remains to be seen what effect Brexit, and the
fact that the UK will lose the ability to shape and drive EU-wide policies, will have on the UK’s
political weight in the global arena.
The anti-avoidance measures incorporated in the ATAD apply in both contexts, between the
EU/EEA Member States and between the EU Member States and third countries. Following
Brexit (if no special arrangement is put in place), the UK will be treated as a third country for
the purposes of the ATAD. Although the applicable minimum standard is similar, several
provisions may be applied differently in a third-country context. First, under article 5 (exit
taxation), the ATAD secures the right of a taxpayer to defer the payment of an exit tax by paying
it in instalments over five years but only for those taxpayers making a transfer to an EU or EEA
Member State. Secondly, article 7 (CFC rules), allows EU Member States to disapply the
substantive activity test when the controlled foreign company is resident or situated in a third
country. Thirdly, the application of article 9 (hybrid mismatches) is currently limited to the
intra-EU context. Finally, and more generally, the ATAD sets out a minimum standard of
protection and Member States may go beyond it. If so, the measures that can be introduced in
relation to other Member States need to respect the free movement law, and be justified and
83BBC News, above fn.81.
84HM Treasury, Business tax road map, above fn.35, 22.
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proportionate. In this respect, businesses operating in a third-country context will be protected
only by the free movement of capital.
4. Conclusion
The swift adoption of the ATAD in less than six months illustrates a feasible change of pace in
EU tax policies. Following the G20-OECD BEPS initiative, the perception that tax policies are
a purely domestic matter has somewhat changed. Tax co-ordination is becoming a more widely
accepted approach at the global level, and this affects the willingness of Member States to engage
in co-operation at the EU level. The BEPS process and the EU anti-tax avoidance agenda have
clearly become mutually reinforcing. However, the progress that has been achieved should be
regarded with some caution from the Internal Market perspective. It is important to conduct an
impact assessment of the direct and indirect implications of the ATAD (and the Anti-Tax
Avoidance Package more generally), with due regard being given to the underlying competitive
forces in the intra-EU and global context. It is necessary to evaluate the potential consequences
for national tax systems and business activity in the Internal Market. This will allow for the
identification and addressing of accompanying difficulties, such as the possible instances of
double taxation, the increased compliance burden on cross-border business activities, the risks
for the tax competitiveness of the Internal Market in the global arena and, in a medium to
long-term period, potentially increased competition over corporate tax rates between Member
States.
At the level of Member States, the effect of the ATAD will differ depending on their general
political support of the G20-OECD BEPS process and the existing state of their anti-avoidance
legislation. For the UK, which has been a loyal supporter of international tax reform from its
earliest stages, the domestic impact of the ATAD will not be as substantial as in some other
countries with a less explicit political commitment. The anti-avoidance mechanisms contained
in the ATAD will not change the trends emerging in the UK’s legal landscape. Some provisions
(such as GAAR and CFC rules) already exist in UK law andwill not require anymaterial changes;
in relation to other provisions (such as the interest limitation rule and hybrids), the UK
Government had already consulted stakeholders and committed to these before the adoption of
the ATAD. The provision that could have changed this evaluation—the switchover clause—was
removed from the compromise text.
Yet, the importance of the ATAD for the UK should not be underestimated. The Directive
made it significantly easier for the UK Government to move forward with the anti-avoidance
measures, backed up by the reassurance that other EUMember States will apply similar standards.
If the early implementation of the BEPS recommendations has been raising concerns because it
undermines the attractiveness of the UK tax system, the ATAD brings the important benefit of
levelling up the playing field with the Internal Market. In addition, one should not underestimate
the impact that the ATADmay have beyond the EU. The early adopters of the G20-OECDBEPS
recommendations will inevitably attract the attention of other countries that are facing similar
choices. The EU’s standard may be followed on various grounds, such as the phenomenon of
“Europeanisation beyond Europe”, conditionality or tax competition forces, which will further
extend the territorial borders of a level playing field.
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Last but not least, one should mention the Brexit vote, which took place a few days after a
political agreement was reached upon this milestone Directive. The negotiations with the EU
will determine the extent to which the UK will have to adhere to the ATAD following its exit
from the EU. One consequence, however, is quite certain. Unless alternative institutional structures
are put in place, the UK will lose access to an important platform for influencing EU-wide tax
policies and any possible modifications of the EU’s standards. With respect to the ATAD, the
UK has so far secured a definite “win”. Nevertheless, it is about to leave the game and let the
rest of the Member States decide upon the future direction of EU co-operation in tax matters.
Base erosion and profit shifting; Brexit; Controlled foreign companies; EU law; Exit charge; Hybrid mismatch
arrangements; Interest deductibility; OECD; Tax avoidance
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